Last updated: April 29, 2026
Agents are LLMs that call tools. Permissions matter exponentially.
The threat model
An agent compromised via prompt injection in any input source (user query, retrieved doc, tool output) executes attacker’s instructions with the agent’s permissions.
Defences
- Least privilege per agent — only the minimum tools needed for its purpose
- Read-only by default — write actions require additional confirmation
- User-confirmation for destructive or external actions
- Sandboxed execution for code-generation agents
- Output validation before tool calls (don’t blindly call API with LLM-generated args)
- Audit log of every agent action
The “lethal trifecta”
An agent with: (1) access to private data, (2) exposure to untrusted content, (3) ability to communicate externally — has all the elements for catastrophic data exfiltration. Avoid this combination.
Module Quiz · 5 questions
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