Blockchain post-quantum migration is a 10-year governance project, not a technical project. The cryptographic primitives are well-understood; persuading 10 million Bitcoin holders and 200 million Ethereum users to migrate their assets to PQ addresses is the actual problem.
The threat model — what’s actually at risk
Three categories of blockchain assets:
- Funds in addresses where the public key has NEVER been revealed (unspent UTXOs in P2PKH or P2WPKH addresses, only the hash of the pubkey is on-chain). Pre-CRQC: derive pubkey from hash requires preimage attack on SHA-256 — infeasible. Post-CRQC: still infeasible (Grover only halves to 2¹²⁸). These funds are safe.
- Funds in addresses where the public key HAS been revealed (any address that’s been spent from, P2PK addresses, taproot keypath spends with revealed pubkey). Post-CRQC: Shor recovers the private key from the public key; attacker can spend the funds. These funds are at risk.
- Future transactions at any address: in-flight transactions in the mempool are vulnerable to a quantum attacker who can derive the private key faster than the transaction is mined.
Estimates of “Bitcoin at risk to Shor” vary: lower bound ~25% (publicly-keyed addresses + Satoshi’s coins at P2PK), upper bound ~70% (counting any address that has ever been spent from). Either way, hundreds of billions of dollars are at quantum risk.
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